数理経済論 第5章　三原　6/15/99

Figure 5.1　social choice rules

$X = \{a, b, c, d\}$
$N = \{1, 2, 3\}$ のとき：



R_1 : abcd
R_2 : abdc
R_3 : dbac

Figure 5.2　the Pareto condition

$A = \{a, c, d\}$

R_1 : a b c d
R_2 : a b d c
R_3 : d b a c

Everybody prefers a to c.



Figure 5.3 : respecting rights



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Figure 5.4



Figure 5.5



Figure 5.6



Figure 5.7

$i \notin G \Rightarrow x I_i y$

Figure 5.8



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
Figure 5.9